

## Message Text

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R 290405Z JUL 76  
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8691  
INFO AMEMBASSY DACCA  
ANDMBASSY ISLAMABAD 5312  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
CINCPAC HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 KABUL 5594

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PFOR, AF  
SUBJ: GETTING IT TOGETHER: THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN'S  
THIRD YEAR

REF:75 KABUL 4439  
B. 75 KABUL 8458  
C. 75 KABUL 8459

1. BEGIN INDRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. JULY 17 IS THE  
ANNIVERSARY OF THE COUP WHICH ESTABLISHED MOHD. DAOUD  
IN POWER AND TRANSFORMED THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN  
FROM A MONARCHY TO A SELF-PROCLAIMED REPUBLIC. THE  
JUST-CONCLUDED "JESHYN" CELEBRATIONS MARKING THE END OF  
THE 3RD YEAR OF THE FLEDGLING REPUBLIC HAD A HOPEFUL, EVEN  
EXPANSIVE TONE. ANOTHER STAGE WAS ANNOUNCED IN THE EVOLUTION  
OF A CONSTITUTION TO REPLACE THE ONE ABROGATED IN 1973,  
AND ITS PROMULGATION GIVEN A SPECIFIC DEADLINE. THIS  
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MAY PROMISE TOO THE NAGGING SUCCESSION

PROBLEM. THE FORTHCOMING PROMULGATION OF A SEVEN-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN ALSO PROMISED AT JESHYN WILL INCREASE EXPECTATIONS THAT THE REGIME WILL SOON SHOW MORE CONCRETE RESULTS IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD. THE FACES IN THE GOVERNMENT THIS YEAR LOOKED MORE FAMILIAR AND REASSURING TO THOSE WHO FEARED THAT THE PRO-SOVIET INCLINATION OF THE GROUP WHICH ASSISTED DAOUD TO POWER WOULD RESULT IN REORIENTATION IN FOREIGN POLICY ALIGNMENT AND DOMESTIC SOCIAL MODELS. EVIDENCE COULD EASILY BE FOUND OF THE SUCCESS OF AFGHANISTAN'S

FOREIGN POLICY GOAL OF A CALCULATED MIX OF EAST AND WEST IN ITS RELATIONS. PODGORNY'S DECEMBER 1975 KABUL VISIT DEMONSTRATED THE BASIC STEADINESS OF AFGHAN/SOVIET RELATIONS. SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY MOHD. NAIM'S JUNE 29-JULY 1 VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT FORD, SECRETARY KISSINGER, AND OTHER AMERICAN LEADERS WERE TANGIBLE PROOF OF U.S. FRIENDSHIP AND THE EXCELLENT STATE OF AFGHAN/AMERICAN RELATIONS. AFGHANISTAN'S ACCEPTABILITY IN THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS WAS SHOWN BY THE PROCESSION OF EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, AND ASIAN DIALOMATIC VISITORS TO KABUL, WHILE THE JULY 4-7 VISIT OF INDIRA GANDHI DEMONSTRATED AFGHAN TIES WITH AN IMPORTANT REGIONAL AND THIRD WORLD POWER. HOWEVER, MORE IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OPTIMISM FELT DURING JESHYN WAS THE JUNE 7-11 DAOUD/BHUTTO SUMMIT MEETING IN KABUL WITH ITS PROMISE OF AN EARLY RETURN VISIT AND THE HOPE THAT THE TROUBLESOME PUSTUNISTAN ISSUE, GIVEN NEW LIFE WITH THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, MIGHT JUST POSSIBLY BE LAID TO REST.

2. YET WHILE THE AFGHAN REPUBLIC'S THIRD YEAR ENDED WELL, IT BEGAN BADLY. THE 1975 JESHYN CELEBRATIONS ENDED PREMATURELY WHEN THE FESTIVAL GROUNDS WERE CLOSED FOR FEAR OF THE SECURITY OF TOP GOA OFFICIALS, AND COMMANDO UNITS DEPATCHED TO THE PANJASHIR, A NEARBY VALLEY TO THE NORTHEAST, WHERE A BATTLE OF UNKNOWN PROPORTIONS HAD BEGUN. KABUL WAS SWEEPED BY RUMOR OF ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENT INSTALLATIONS IN PANJSHIR AND PROVINCES BORDERING PAKISTAN, OF MAJOR BATTLES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT FORCES AND BANDITS...  
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OR PAKISTANI GUERILLAS OR KABUL UNIVERSITY STUDENTS OR LOCAL DISSIDENTS OR RIGHT WING ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS. WHATEVER THE IMAGINED BEST, THE GENERAL POPULACE SAW THE DAOUD REGIME ENTERING ITS THIRD YEAR FACED WITH THE GREATEST CHALLENGE YET TO ITS AUTHORITY.

3. THE MOOD OF THE REPUBLIC AS IT ENTERED ITS FOURTH YEAR CONTRASTS STRONGLY WITH THE CONFUSION AND ALARMS THAT

FOLLOWED LAST YEAR'S JESHYN. YET THERE IS AN CONSISTENT LINE OF DEVELOPMENT FROM THE PANJSHIR VIOLENCE TO THE PRESENT, A LINE THAT LINKS CRUCIAL POINTS OF DECISION FOR THE DAOUD REGIME. IT WAS THESE DECISIONS WHICH LED TO THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS AND SUCCESSES WHICH GAVE THIS YEAR'S JESHYN CELEBRATION ITS SELF-CONFIDENT AND RELAXED TONE. THAT LINE OF DEVELOPMENT, WHICH THIS CABLE TRACES, HAS BEEN PARALLEL TO U.S. INTERESTS IN REGIONAL STABILITY AND CONTINUED AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE FROM UNDUE SOVIET INFLUENCE. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

4. THE PANJSHIR DISTURBANCE AND SCATTERED VIOLENCE IN OTHER PROVINCES DURING JULY OF 1975 POSED NO REAL THREAT TO THE POLICE POWERS OF THE STATE. WITHIN A FEW DAYS GOVERNMENT FORCES CAPTURED SEVERAL DOZEN ARMED YOUNG AFGHANS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE VIOLENCE. ACCORDING TO

GOVERNMENT SOURCES THEY WERE PREDOMINANTLY KABUL UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS WHO HAD FLED AFGHANISTAN

TO PAKISTAN, RECEIVED TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE, AND RE-

ENTERED AFGHANISTAN. THEIR INTENT WAS THE OVERTHROWING OF THE "GODLESS" DAOUD REGIME, PLANTING THE GREEN BANNER OF ISLAM AND FOUNDING THE CALIPHATE. WHILE NO REAL THREAT, PANJSHIR NEVERTHELESS WAS A WATERSHED FOR THE POLICIES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN (GOA). WHETHER AIDED BY PAKISTAN OR NOT, PANJSHIR SHOWED THE PERIL OF AFGHANISTAN'S PUSHTUNISTAN POLICY BY DEMONSTRATING THAT THE INTERIOR OF AFGHANISTAN WAS VULNERABLE TO VIOLENCE GENERATED BY RELIGIOUS, IDEOLOGICAL, OR ETHNIC GRUDGES AGAINST THE REGIME. THE IMPACT WAS INTENSIFIED AS PRESIDENT DAOUD (AND HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY) SUBSEQUENTLY MULLED THE CONFIDENTIAL

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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MURDER OF MUJIBUR RAHMAN, (WHOM DAOUD HAD MET IN DACCA IN MARCH) AND THE INITIAL, THOUGH SPURIOUS, ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE "ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH".

5. THE TREND TOWARD MODERATION IN OFFICIAL GOA STATEMENTS ABOUT PAKISTAN AND PUSHTUNISTAN WAS REINFORCED BY PANJSHIR. WHILE CONVINCED THAT THE VIOLENCE INVOLVED "REACTIONARIES... ARMED, TRAINED, AND PROVOKED BY PAKISTAN" THE GOA NONETHELESS TOOK A RELATIVELY MODERATE TONE TOWARD PAKISTAN IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF PANJSHIR. WARINESS, IT SEEMS, OVERCAME DESIRE TO GET EVEN. NOR DID THE GOA MOUNT THE ANTICIPATED PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN WHEN THE DECISION OF THE PAKISTANI SUPREME COURT UPHOLDING THE BAN OF THE NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY (NAP) WAS PUBLISHED

IN LATE OCTOBER. IN LATE NOVEMBER P.. BHUTTO ALLEGED THAT AFGHANISTAN HAD CANCELLED MILITARY LEAVES AND WAS MOBILIZING TROOPS NEAR THE BORDER. WHILE AFGHAN HONOR DEMANDED AN OFFICIAL REJECTION OF THESE (FALSE) CHARGES, NOTICABLY LACKING WAS ANY RHETORIC ON THE RIGHTS OF "PUSHTUN AND BALUCH BROTHERS" OR ANY ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE OCCASION TO RAIL AGAINST THE NAP DECISION.

6. WHILE DAOUD IS HISTORICALLY THE MAJOR PROPONENT OF PUSHTUNISTAN, THAT ISSUE HAS ALSO BEEN IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIET-ORIENTED "PARCHAM" PARTY WHICH, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD DEMONSTRATED AGAINST THE MONARCHY'S MODERATE POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN DURING THE 1971 INDO-PAK WAR. THE INFLUENCE OF THE "PRO-SOVIET" FACTION AMONG THE

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GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENTS FOLLOWING THE COUP HAD BEEN DIMINISHED BY THE END OF THE REPUBLIC'S 2ND YEAR (REF A).

HOWEVER, THE MINISTERS OF INTERIOR AND AGRICULTURE AT THE TIME OF PANJSHIR WERE GENERALLY IDENTIFIED WITH THIS LEFTIST FACTION AND WERE CONSIDERED SUPPORTERS OF A TOUGH PUSHTUNISTAN POLICY. THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE HAD NEVER FOUND FAVOR WITH CONSERVATIVE AFGHAN MUSLIMS, AND PANSHIR GRAPHICALLY DEMONSTRATED THE ANTIPATHY OF ULTRA-CONSERVATIVE MUSLIMS TO THIS FACTION AND TO CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. PANJSHIR WAS AN UNDOUBTED FACTOR IN ACCELERATING THE LOSS OF INFLUENCE OF SOVIET-ORIENTED MEMBERS OF THE GOA AND THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THEM.

7. IN EARLY SEPTEMBER THE GOA ANNOUNCED THE REPLACEMENT OF THREE PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS. WHILE THERE WAS NO OBVIOUS  
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IDEOLOGICAL CRITERION APPLIED, THE APPOINTMENTS INVOLVED FIGURES WHO HAD SERVED BEFORE THE 1973 COUP AND SOME WHO HAD DEMONSTRATED THEIR LOYALTY TO DAOUD DURING HIS 1953-63 PREMIERSHIP. ALSO A MINOR SHAKE-UP TOOK PLACE WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE INVOLVING THE RETURN TO DUTY AND ASSIGNMENT OF MORE SENIOR OFFICERS TO KEY POSTIONS. ON SEPTEMBER 24 THE LEFTIST DEPUTY MINISTER OF FRONTIERS AFFAIRS WAS REPLACED. THREE DAYS LATER A MAJOR CABINET SHAKE-UP WAS ANNOUNCED WHICH INVOLVED THE DISMISSAL OF THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, THE DEMOTION OF THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR TO MINISTER OF FRONTIERS AFFAIRS (WHERE, WE BELIEVE, HIS NEW DEPUTY HAS KEPT A CLOSE WATCH ON HIS ACTIONS), AND THE FILLING OF VACANT POSTIONS WITH NON-IDEOLOGICAL TECHNOCRATS OR OLDER PROVEN CIVIL SERVANTS. THESE CHANGES REVERBERATED THROUGH THE LOWER LEVELS OF THE BUREAUCRACY AS WELL: MANY OBSERVERS BELIEVE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE IMMEDIATE MANDATE OF THE NEW MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE WAS TO CLEAN HOUSE OF HIS PREDECESSOR'S APPOINTEES.

8. THE CABINET SHAKE-UP LEFT NO DOUBT THAT THE INFLUENCE OF THE GROUP WHICH ASSISTED DAOUD TO POWER IN 1973 HAD RADICALLY DIMINISHED. DAOUD MOVED QUICKLY TO STRENGTHEN HIS POSTION BY ATTEMPTING TO HEAL THE RIFT CAUSED BY THE COUP WITHIN HIS (AU THE FORMER KING'S) PUSHTEN CLAN, THE MOHAMMADZAIS. ON ID-AL-FITR, A TRADITIONAL TIME FOR RECONCILIATION AND PARDONS, THE GOA ANNOUNCED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S AMNESTY OF PRISONERS INCLUDED A SMALL NUMBER OF PERSONS INCARCERATED AT THE TIME OF THE COUP. AMONG THEM WAS MUSA SHAFIQ, THE KING'S LAST PRIME MINISTER. SEVERAL DAYS LATER ON OCT 5 THE GOA ANNOUNCED THAT ABDUL WALI HAD BEEN EXONERATED BY MILITARY TRIBUNAL (OF UNSPECIFIED CHARGES). ABDUL WALI, DAOUD'S COUSIN AND FORMER MAJOR RIVAL IN THE SHIFTING ALLIANCES

OF AFGHAN ROYAL POLICIES, WAS CENTRAL FORCES COMMANDER AT THE TIME OF THE COUP. WHILE HIS RELEASE AND EXONERATION HAS NOT IN ITSELF UNIFIED THE MOHAMMADZAIS, IT HAS MADE POSSIBLE THE HEALING OF SOME SCARS LEFT BY THE COUP. THIS WAS ALSO A TIME OF RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY, OF LESS IMPORTANT OFFICERS JAILED OR PUT IN RESERVE STATUS SINCE THE COUP. TO THE WIDER AFGHAN  
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AUDIENCE THESE EVENTS WERE SIGNS THAT WHILE THE GOA ESPOUSES REFORM AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, THOSE ENDS WILL BE ACHIEVED IN FAMILIAR AND PREDICTABLE AFGHAN WAYS, NOT THROUGH THE IMPOSITION OF FOREIGN IDEOLOGIES OR SOCIAL MODELS.

9. THE DIMINUTATION OF LEFTIST INFLUENCE WITHIN THE GOA AND THE RELEASE OF CERTAIN POLITICAL PRISONERS TAKEN DURING THE COUP WAS WIDELY INTERPRETED DOMESTICALLY AND BY FOREIGN MEDIA AS A SHIFT AWAY FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND TOWARDS THE WEST. THESE INTERPRETATION UNDOUBTEDLY AFFECTED THE TIMING OF PODGORNYY'S DECEMBER 9-10 KABUL VISIT (KABUL 8103, 11DEC75). WHILE THE GOA EXTENDED FULL PROTOCOL HONORS, THE VISIT WAS NOTICABLY LACKING IN GENUINE WARMTH FROM THE AFGHANS. PRIOR TO THE VISIT THE GOA TOOK PAINS TO REASSURE THE U.S. AND THE PRC THAT AFGHANISTAN'S RESPECTIVE BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED. THE ONLY SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT PRODUCED DURING PODGORNYY'S VISIT WAS RENEWAL OF THE

AFGHAN-SOVIET "MUTUAL NON-AGGRESSION AND NEUTRALITY TREATY OF 1931" WHICH PRECLUDES AFGHANISTAN'S BEING USED AS A TERRITORY FROM WHICH ACTS INIMICAL TO SOVIET INTERESTS CAN BE CONDUCTED. THIS IS, IN FACT, THE SINE QUA NON OF THE RELATIONSHIP, THE ROCK BOTTOM REQUIREMENT OF THE AFGHANS BY THE SOVIETS. BEYOND THE ASSURANCE OF BE DRAWN FROM THE RENEWED PROTOCOL,

IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT OTHER COMFORT SOVIETS COULD DERIVE FROM THEIR MEETING WITH THE PRICKLY AFGHAN NATIONALIST, MOHD. DAOUD. THE VISIT HAD NO APPARENT EFFECT ON THE CONTINUING TREND OF REPLACING YOUNGER, IDEOLOGICALLY ORIENTED OFFICIALS WITH NON-POLITICAL TECHNOCRATS OR FIGURES WITH PRE-COUP GOVERNMENT SERVICE.

10. WHILE THE OUSTING OF PRO-SOVIET OFFICIALS AND THE MOHAMMADZAI RECONCILIATION REMOVED POSSIBLE CONSTRAINT ON DAOUD'S FREEDOM TO IMPROVE PAK/AFGHAN RELATIONS, THE EARLY MONTHS OF 1976 SAW LITTLE PROSPECT FOR AMELIORATION. WHILE OFFICIAL GOA STATEMENTS REMAINED

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MODERATE, THE PROPAGANDA FROM EACH SIDE ROSE TO FORMER LEVELS AND BEHIND THE SCENES ATTEMPTS TO ARRANGE BILATERAL TALKS FOUNDERED UNDER THE WEIGHT OF PAST SUSPICION AND MISUNDERSTANDING. THE BREAKTHROUGH CAME APRIL 26 WITH P.M. BHUTTO'S UNEXPECTED AND GENEROUS OFFER OF 1 MILLION DOLS OF ASSISTANCE TO RELIEVE THE EFFECTS OF A SEVERE EARTHQUAKE IN AFGHANISTAN, COUPLED WITH A MORATORIUM ON HOSTILE PROPAGANDA. PRESIDENT DAOUD'S PROMPT EXPRESSION OF THANKS WAS FOLLOWED BY THE CESSATION OF ANTI-PAKISTAN PROPAGANDA AND, ON MAY 7, DAOUD'S PUBLIC INVITATION THAT BHUTTO COME TO KABUL.

11. THE JUNE 7-11 DAOUD/BHUTTO SUMMIT WAS NOT EXPECTED TO RESOLVE A QUARREL OF SUCH LONG STANDING. YET THE VERY PROSPECT OF THE MEETING DREW AN OPTIMISTIC AND INTERSTED RESPONSE FROM THE AFGHAN POPULACE THOUGH LEFTIST GROUPS SURREPTITIOUSLY PROPAGANDIZED AGAINST IT. GIVEN THE PRIOR STATE OF PAK/AFGHAN RELATIONS, THE MEETING WAS SUCCESSFUL INDEED. THE MEETING PRODUCED AN AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE THE DE FACTO MORATORIUM ON HOSITLE PROPAGANDA, AND THE PROMISE THAT DAOUD WOULD SOON PAY A RETURN VISIT TO ISLAMABAD TO CONTINUE TALKS. FROM THE KABUL PERSPECTIVE, EQUALLY SIGNIFICANT WAS THE OPPORTUNITY FROM PRESIDENT DAOUD TO MAKE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH AND TAKE THE MEASURE OF P.M. BHUTTO, AND TO DISCOVER THAT THE PROSPECT OF BETTER RELATIONS PRODUCED NO SIGNIFICANT DOMESTIC OPPOSITION. HE FOUND IN FACT THAT IT MET WITH POPULAR APPROVAL: A PHENOMENON DEMONSTRATED ANEW BY THE VERY ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION AFFORDED PAKISTANI ARTISTS AND ATHLETES WHO CAME TO KABUL TO PERFORM

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DURING THE JEHSYN CELEBRATIONS. FOR ITS PART THE  
GOA'S ACTIONS SINCE THE SUMMIT IN THE MAIN DEMONSTRATE  
CONTINUING CARE NOT TO CHILL AGAIN THE THAW IN PAK/  
AFGHAN RELATIONS BEGUN SO HOPEFULLY IN JUNE (KABUL 5506).

12. THE SUMMIT WAS RAPIDLY FOLLOWED BY EVIDENCES OF

THE SUCCESS OF AFGHANISTAN'S GLOBAL AND REGIONAL FOREIGN

POLICIES. AFGHANISTAN HAS LONG SOUGHT GUARANTEES OF  
ITS INDEPENDENCE THROUGH A CAREFUL AND VISIBLE MIX OF  
EAST AND WEST IN ITS BILATERAL RELATIONS. SOME 6 MONTHS  
AFTER PODGORNYY'S VISIT TO KABUL, DAOUD'S SPECIAL ENVOY  
AND PRINCIPAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR MOHD. NAIM VISITED  
WASHINGTON (WITH PARIS AS AN ADD-ON). HIS MEETINGS  
WITH PRESIDENT FORD, SECRETARY KISSINGER AND MEMBERS OF  
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CONGRESS DURING HIS JUNE 29-JULY 1 STAY WERE VISIBLE  
PROOF TO THE AFGHAN POPULACE OF AMERICA'S CONTINUING  
FRIENDSHIP AND SUPPORT OF AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE. SIMI-  
LARLY INDIAN P.M. INDIRA GANDHI'S JULY 4-7 VISIT DEMON-  
STRATED THE DETERMINATION OF AFGHAN REGIONAL POLICY.  
THE VISIT WAS SHORT ON SUBSTANCE BUT AFFORDED THE GOA  
AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMPARE NOTES ON P.M. BHUTTO AS

THE LEADER OF THE COUNTRY WHOSE NORMALIZATION OF  
RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN ALSO PROVIDED MOMENTUM FOR THE  
PAK/AFGHAN SUMMIT MEETING. MORE PUBLICLY THE VISIT  
DEMONSTRATED CONTINUING GOA ATTENTION TO MAINTAINING



GOOD RELATIONS WITH AN IMPORTANT REGIONAL POWER  
AND THIRD WORLD INFLUENTIAL.

13. MAINTENANCE OF THE GOOD STATE OF RELATIONS WITH  
IRAN HAS BEEN LESS SUCCESSFUL. WHILE THE THAW IN  
PAK/AFGHAN RELATIONS AND THE EVEN TENOR OF INDO/AFGHAN  
RELATIONS WERE WELCOMED IN TEHRAN, AFGHAN/IRANIAN  
RELATIONS HAVE DEVELOPED POINTS OF FRICTION. OLD DIS-  
PUTE OVER DIVISION OF THE WATERS OF THE HELMAND RIVER,  
PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF IRANIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSIS-  
TANCE, THE PROBLEM OF AFGHANS ILLEGALLY WORKING IN IRAN,  
AND MINOR DISPUTES OVER DEMARCATION OF THE NORTHERN  
REACHES OF THE COMMON BORDER BUBBLE BENEATH THE SURFACE  
OF VISIBLY GOOD RELATIONS ESTABLISHED BY THE 1974  
IRANIAN OFFER OF MASSIVE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND CON-  
FIRMED BY DAOUD'S MAY 1975 TEHRAN VISIT.

14. THE THIRD YEAR OF THE AFGHAN REPUBLIC SAW STEADY  
PROGRESS TOWARD THE REGULARIZATION OF AFGHANISTAN'S  
INTERNAL POLITICS AS WELL AS ITS EXTERNAL RELATIONS.  
THE RETURN TO A MORE TRADITIONAL MIX OF AFGHAN GOVERNMENT  
FIGURES HAS ALREADY BEEN NOTED. IN ADDITION, THE REGIME  
MADE PROGRESS IN REDEEMING A MAJOR PROMISE: THE PROMUL-  
GATION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION TO REPLACE THE 1964 CON-  
STITUTION ABROGATED BY THE COUP. ON THE EVE OF NAWROZ  
(AFGHAN NEW YEAR-MARCH 21) DAOUD ANNOUNCED THAT A  
DRAFT CONSTITUTION WAS BEING GIVEN TO A COMMITTEE OF  
20 FOR STUDY. WHILE THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE  
WAS ANNOUNCED, THE DRAFT ITSELF REMAINED SECRET. IN  
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HIS JULY 16 JESHYN SPEECH DAOUD ANNOUNCED THAT THE  
COMMITTEE HAD COMPLETED ITS DELIBERATIONS AND RETURNED  
THE DRAFT TO THE GOVERNMENT, AND THAT BEFORE THE AFGHAN  
YEAR'S END THE DRAFT WOULD BE RATIFIED BY LOYAK JIRGAH  
(ROUGHLY, 12- NATIONAL CONVOCATION OF TRIBAL, RELIGIOUS,  
ETHNIC, PROVINCIAL, AND URBAN LEADERS). THE SECRECY  
THAT HAS SURROUNDED THE DRAFT, ESPECIALLY THE CRUCIAL  
ISSUES OJIKCZHIRZY, #AND THE STATUS OF POLITICAL PARTIES  
KOR PARTY), HAS STIFLED ANY SUBSTANTIAL  
DEBATE OR EXCITEMENT OVER ZASESSTB WDVZ# CONSTITUTION.

YET WHILE SOME INFORMED AFGHANS DISMISS ITS IMPORTANCE,  
THE CONVENING OF A LOYAH JIRGAH WILL BE ITSELF BE A  
MAJOR POLITICAL EVENT. MOVEOVER IF, AS WE SUSPECT,  
THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR A LEGAL POLITICAL PUCTY,  
THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN WILL HAVE ITS FIRST  
LEGITIMATE FORUM FOR POLITICAL MANEUVER AND DEBATE.  
FURTHER, PROVISION FOR SUCCESSION WILL GIVE SUBSTANCE  
TO THE REGIME'S CLAIM TO A REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERN-

MENT. ANOTHER PROMISE ALSO PARTLY REDEEMED AT NAW-ROZ WAS THE BEGINNING OF THE 7 YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN, THOUGH THE TEXT OF THE PLAN IN ITS ENTIRETY HAS YET TO BE PUBLISHED. THERE IS NO DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT DAOUD IS COMMITTED TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BETTERMENT OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN TO REDEEM HIS PROMISES FOR A MORE ABUNDANT LIFE MADE UPON HIS ACCESSION TO POWER AND REITERATED FREQUENTLY SINCE.

15. CONCLUSION AND COMMENT. LAST YEAR'S ANALYSIS OF THE GOA'S SECOND YEAR IN POWER STRESSED DAOUD'S ACCENDENCY AND CONTROL OF THE LEVERS OF GOVERNMENT. THE REPUBLIC'S THIRD YEAR HAS NOT ONLY DEMONSTRATED THAT CONTROL BUT ALSO HAS BEEN A WATERSHED YEAR IN INDICATING THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICY DIRECTIONS TOWARD WHICH THAT POWER WILL BE EXERTED. TEMPTING AS THE PHRASE MAY BE, IT HAS NOT BEEN A YEAR OF RETURN TO "NORMALCY". EVEN THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS MOVED SIGNIFICANTLY TOWARD MORE FAMILIAR AND PREDICTABLE COMPOSITION AND FORMS OF GOVERNANCE, THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IS NOT THE KINGDOM OF AFGHANISTAN. THOUGH CONFIDENTIAL

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THE MOHAMMADZAI CLAN RETAINS SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE, THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION OF THE COUNTRY IS MORE VIGOROUSLY HELD, ITS IDEALS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION MORE BELIEVABLY CHAMPIONED THAN WERE EVIDENT IN THE LATER YEARS OF THE MONARCHY. YET THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICIES PURSUED BY THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IN THE THIRD YEAR OF ITS EXISTANCE INDICATE PROGRESS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THE PROGRESS MADE TOWARDS REGULARIZATION OF ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND RAPPROCHEMENT WITH PAKSITAN ARE CLEARLY PARALLEL TO U.S. INTEREST IN AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE FROM UNDUE SOVIET INFLUENCE AND IN REGIONAL STABILITY.

16. FOR THE FUTURE, ONE PROBLEM WHICH OVERSHADOWS ALL OTHERS, IN THE MINDS OF THE AFGHAN ELITE AS WELL AS OF FOREIGN OBSERVERS LIKE OURSELVES, IS: AFTER DAOUD, WHAT? HOPEFULLY THE NEW CONSTITUTION WILL PROVIDE SOME MEANS FOR ASSURING STABILITY WHEN THIS 67-YEAR OLD LEADER DEPARTS THE SCENE, BUT THAT QUESTION HAS NOT YET BEEN ANSWERED. ANOTHER PROBLEM TO WHICH NO SOLUTION HAS BEEN FOUND IS HOW TO GET AFGHANISTN'S ECONOMY MOVING MORE RAPIDLY --

HOW TO TRANSLATE DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES INTO  
TANGIBLE ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR THE PEOPLE OF  
THE COUNTRY.

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## Message Attributes

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**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 29 JUL 1976  
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**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
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**Review Authority:** ShawDG  
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**Review History:** RELEASED <27 APR 2004 by buchant0>; APPROVED <07 SEP 2004 by ShawDG>  
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**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
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